McKesson v. Lowery by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons




Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "McKesson v. Lowery" (1959). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 9.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/9
\Ve agree "With 
and there 
the defendant to 
based. 
Schauer, 
A. No. 251:50. In Bank. Mar. 2, 
WILLIAIVI B. as District Attorney of the 
v. JOSEPH 1\L LOW-
ERY, as Auditor o£ the County of Los Re-
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his apply to an oftleer who is to fill 
tenn of but not to one 
fill the term; they do not a salary increase for an 
ofilcer elected to fill an unexpired t<:l'nl \vhere the increase is 
adopted a su!!lcient time prior to the election to with 
any local 
[3] St2~tutcs-Construction-Legislative Intent.--It is a funda-
mental rule of statutory construction that the statute be 
scrutinized in the intent. 
Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Public 
McK. Dig. References: 2, 4-6] Public Officers, § 110(1); [3] 
Statutes, § 114. 
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PROCEEDING in mandamus to a county auditor to 
pay a increase for a district attorney elected to fill the 
unexpired term of his ·writ 
William B. District 
in pro per., for Petitioner. 
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los , Wil-
liam E. Assistant County Counsel, and Donald K. 
Byrne, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
CAR'fER, J.-The question presented by this for a 
\Yrit of mandate is whether petitioner is entitled to payment of 
the salary increase which became effective after his 
ment to the office of district of I~os County 
but prior to his election to that office for the unex-
pired term of his The factual situation 
by the petition is as follows: 
On June 5, 1956, S. Ernest Roll was elected District Attor-
ney of Los for a term whieh was 
to commence on the first in December of 1956. 2\fr. 
Roll died on October 1956. On December 4, 1956, whieh 
662 McKEsso~ v. lJOWERY C.2d 
was after Mr. Roll's term was to commence, \Villiam B. Me-
herein, vms appointed to the office of district 
attornry. He ;,yas to hold office until tho election and qualifi-
cation of his successor. (Los County Charter, § 16.) 
At the next general election, which was in June, 1958, peti-
tioner was elected for a two-year term, the balance of Mr. 
Roll's term. 
for district attorney at the time of petitioner's 
was $23,000 per 1957, an 
ordinance was increasing the to $25,000 per 
year. After his election petitioner requested Joseph .M:. 
I,owery, the auditor of lJOS Angeles County, to enter the salary 
change on the county records and to pay him accordingly. 
The request was and now petitioner seeks a writ of 
mandate to compel the county auditor to pay his salary at the 
increased rate. 
Article XI, section 5, of the California Constitution pro-
vides that "the compensation of any county, township or mu-
nicipal officer shall not be increased after his election or during 
his term of office .... " Section 52 of the Los Angeles County 
Charter provides that ''the compensation of any elective 
county or township officer shall not be increased or diminished 
during the term for which he was elected, nor within ninety 
days preceding his election.'' 
[1] Petitioner contends that, since the President of the 
United States has not proclaimed the termination of hostilities 
in the Korean \Var, the operation of the above provisions is 
still pursuant to sections 53070 and 53071 of the 
Government Code, and he is entitled to the increased salary 
from the effective date of the ordinance authorizing it, Octo-
ber 18, 1957. Section 53071 suspended the operation of provi-
sions prohibiting the increase of compensation of elective 
officers during time of war as defined by section 53070. This 
eontention has recently been answered adversely in Rapp v. 
Uil!SOII, p. 4()7 [334 P.2d 575]. 
[2a] Petitioner next contends that the constitutional and 
nharter provisions, although precluding his receiving the in-
ereased salary during his appointive term, do not so preclude 
);jm during his elective term. These provisions, petitioner 
claims, apply to an officer who is appointed to fill an unexpired 
tern1 of office, but not to one who is elected to fill the term. 
It is our opinion that this contention is correct. 
[3] It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that 
the statute be scrutinized in the light of the legislative intent. 
::\'Iar. 
ter1n 
McKEssox v. LowEIW 
C.2d G60; 335 P.2d 6621 
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P. .) ~Where; the 
ha,; been of the 
the election of the one \rho is to fill tl1e unex-
tem1, this danger is not \Yhether a eam1idate 
i:.; elected is a matter to ihe public "I,Yill. Th;: c:am1idate 
o[ ('Oursc', cannot be certain of the ontconw of the 
and it ~would indeed be an optimistic eandidate who 
to proL:nrc a increase for the position to which 
election. 
Tho fads of the case demonstrate the absence 
danger against which the prohibitions are directed. 
'fhe salary ordinance 1vas enacted some nine months prior to 
the time of the election. \Vhile at that time the petitioner 
may have decided to beeome a candidate, he could not know 
what opposition he y;ould have or what the election results 
v·;ould be. 'fo attempt to srenre a salary inerea~e at t;wt time 
>nmld be the result of mere ~ll'ishful thinking. 
[2b] There is no need to give the provisions here involved 
any interpretation broader than that necessary to aecomplish 
their ol!vious purpose. \V e hold, therefore, that article XI, 
section 5, of the Ccdifontia Constitution, and section 52 of the 
Los Angeles County Charter do not J)rohibit a salary increase 
for an offlcer elected to fill an unexpired term, where the 
increase is adopted a sufficient time prior to the eleetion to 
comply with any loeal provisions. Petitioner is therefore en-
titlf'd to the incrrased salary from and after ,Tu1y 1, 1958. 
has cited Larew v. 81 Cal. (590 
P. 227]; Rtorkc v. Gmrx, 129 Cal. 526 [62 P. 68]; Harrison 
v. Colgan, 148 Cal. 69 P. 674]; :wd Robbins v. 
43 Cal.App.2cl 463 [111 P.2d 5], as eontt'olling authority in 
this cm:e. 'rhose cases are distinguishable in that they involved 
persons appointed, not elected, to an unexpired trrm. [6] An 
appointee stands in the same shoes as his prec1reessor. More-
over, although the danger of undue influence on the salary-
authorizing body is not as great with an appointee as it is 
with an incumbent officer, the danger is nonetheless sufficient 
enough to warrant imposition of the eonstitutional and charter 
prohibitions. 
Let the writ issue directing respondent to pay to petitioner 
the increased salary for the offieo of district attorney of IJOS 
and con-
there eannot 
the statutory term '' 
persons may hold for successive parts of the term, 
so that one who is elected or appointed after a part of such 
term has cannot have an increase made after the term 
prior to his election or appointment." (II arri-
snpra, 148 Cal. at 75.) 
these cases the ''term of office'' herein is that to 
-vvhich Mr. Roll was 1 and the salary ordinance, enacted 
after that term cannot take effect until the com-
mencement of the next term of office in 1960. The majority 
opinion nevertheless holds that the ordinance became effec-
tive on 1, the date that petitioner commenced serv-
the part of the term for which he was elected. 
It does not overrule the eases, but seeks to distin-
them on the ground that they apply only to persons 
and not to those elected for an unexpired term. 
this distinction as meretricious. The express appli-
cation of section 5 of article XI of the Constitution to "any" 
connty officer precludes any implication that only appointed 
officers are included in its prohibition or that the phrase "his 
term of office" has one meaning for elected officers and a quite 
different for officers or varies in meaning 
to whether the officer is elected or appointed for the 
fuH regular term of the office or for an unexpired part thereof. 
The section no more the exclusion from its operation 
'Section 13 of the Los County Charter provides that the term 
of office for district attorney 'shall be four years, beginning at noon of 
the first Monday in December following the election, and ending at noon 
on the first Monday in December four years thereafter." 
LOWERY 665 
continues 
concurred. 
